PPBS TO PPBE: A PROCESS OR PRINCIPLES?
Secretary of Defense McNamara, who is the Secretary of Defense that developed the Planning Programming and Budget System, stated in April of 1963 "You cannot make decisions simply by asking yourself whether something might be nice to have.
You have to make a judgment on how much is enough." 1 The nature and size of the current Defense Budget illustrates the importance of these two broad questions. The FY 2008 President's Budget (PB) request surpassed half a trillion dollars for defense, and this request exceeds the combined budgets of all other federal agencies and departments. 3 Additionally, as the population ages the government continues committing increasing portions of federal spending to provide economic security and health care. 4 Federal expenditures for social security and health insurance grew from 18 percent in 1964 to 41 percent in 2007 of the federal budget, and without sizable tax increases, will approach 58 percent in the year 2025. 5 With limited resources available and competing demands for civilian departments and non-defense programs, 6 DoD leaders must have processes that can inform their decision making and ultimately help justify the enormity of the budget requests sent to Congress. The key issue this paper will examine is how does DoD go about answering such questions. This paper first examines the Defense Department's most important resource management system --the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) developed by Secretary McNamara --and then how it evolved into the current Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. This paper will next address the relevancy of this system in today's complex, global strategic environment. Key insights from proponents and detractors who analyzed these systems and processes will be explored with the goal of offering recommendations for change or areas that require further examination. As history informs decision makers, this paper begins by tracing the beginnings of PPBS back over 45 years to President Kennedy's administration and Secretary Robert McNamara.
In the Beginning:
In 1961, Robert McNamara sought a more active role in managing the Department of Defense (DoD) by exercising to a greater extent the statutory authorities available to him as the Secretary of Defense. 7 Secretary McNamara wanted to achieve the following two key strategic management challenges: (1) integrate and balance foreign policy, military strategy, force requirements, and the defense budget and (2) approach all defense programs in a rational and analytical way and base resolutions on national interest. 8 The Secretary faced a daunting task as this was going against the current Defense Department's management culture. Prior to 1961, legal authorities existed that placed the role of the Secretary of Defense as the operating head of DoD, but they were not exercised. 9 Each Service focused on its own priorities, which was considered detrimental to joint missions and resulted in effectively unbalanced military forces. 10 It became evident that up until that time, the Secretaries of Defense lacked the necessary management and control tools to support a more active strategy and management role envisioned by Secretary McNamara. 11 With no real independent and integrated staff support, the DoD lacked central leadership in their interaction with the Services. The
Defense Secretaries played more as a judge or referee versus a leader. 12 Secretary
McNamara changed that by taking two important and interrelated actions. First he directed a systematic analysis of all DoD requirements and incorporated these requirements into a five-year, program-oriented defense budget. 13 Then, he directed actions which resulted in formation of a rational resource allocation system that was later called the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) 14 -the precursor to the current PPBE process.
Leading the systematic analysis and the actions directed by the Secretary fell to Charles J. Hitch, the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller), and who is regarded as the father of PPBS. 15 He viewed his key responsibility as a developer of management techniques, which would then empower the Secretary, by providing the unbiased management data to enable him to actively lead the department. 16 Accomplishing goals for such a large organization does not result from luck. A complex organization needs to establish a process-a systematic series of actions directed to some end, 17 or articulate enduring underlying principles-fundamental doctrine or tenet, 18 or develop a system-an ordered and comprehensive assemblage of facts, principles, doctrines, or the like in a particular field of knowledge or thought. 19 The DoD, under the leadership of Charles Hitch, developed PPBS as a system, which had underlying process and basic principles. 20 The general design, Congress could use to measure the requirement for and sufficiency of defense programs. 23 Central to this purpose was to link, integrate, and provide a bridge between planning and budgeting, so that planning would be fiscally informed and annual budgets would follow instead of leading plans. 24 The PPBS developed by Hitch and others on Secretary McNamara's staff facilitated fulfilling the purpose by identifying the system's fundamental principles.
There are six fundamental principles that underpinned the PPBS. First, decision making must be based on explicit criteria of national interest in defense programs, as opposed to compromise among entities associated with DoD. 25 Second, leaders need to consider military needs and cost together, because decisions concerning forces and budgets cannot be made absent one or the other. 26 Third, senior decision makers must explicitly consider balanced and feasible alternatives that incorporate costs, forces, and strategies together in any alternatives. 27 Fourth, leaders must have and actively use an independent analytical staff at the top policy making levels. 28 Fifth, the outcome of this system must result in developing a multiyear force and financial plan which incorporates forces and costs and projects into the future to identify the foreseeable implication of current decisions. 29 little mention of these can be found in the many later discussions concerning PPBS and PPBE, which can lead one to the erroneous belief that PPBS and PPBE are synonymous with just their detailed supporting processes. A review of the major modifications to the PPBS over the years will lead to a better understanding of how some change undertaken either supports the underlying fundamental ideas or not and that the effect can be a result of happenstance and not explicit design.
The Modifications
Over the last four decades, the original PPBS process has undergone numerous modifications or adjustments, but they were mainly evolutionary in nature. The evolution of the PPBS can be traced to the management styles Secretaries of Defense (SecDefs) used in resolving the issues they faced as well as the challenges. 37 The actions taken by presidential administrations highlight how the PPBS evolved. 38 The first major and most enduring change in the PPBS occurred during President and therefore eliminated DPMs and created a guidance process. 39 The Joint Chiefs and the Services became responsible for force planning (requirements determination) and the Services for initial program development, which left OSD to review and evaluate the programs proposed by the Services. 40 The Services were each issued fiscal guidance, often referred to as the topline, and programmatic objectives. Fiscal Guidance defined the resources available to the Services, and Defense Strategy Guidance prescribed the capabilities the Services were to provide in their Program Objectives Memorandums (POMs). 41 OSD reviewed the POMs, identified issues for consideration by the Secretary, and prepared papers delineating those issues. The Secretary's decisions on the issues, were codified in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), and incorporated into the FYDP. 42 In general terms, this approach stills exist today.
Over the next forty years, the defense program was affected by four trends; first, The PPBS transformed, not only in its acronym metamorphosis into the PPBE process in 2003, but there were other evolutionary enhancements to place more emphasis on planning, gain more input from the Combatant Commanders and focus on capabilities. While a discussion covering the changes that occurred will be presented later under the section titled The Current Process, this paper will now discuss insights of two key organizations that analyzed PPBE's strengths and weaknesses, which then led to some of these reforms.
PPBS Analysis and Perspectives
In addition to the events undertaken by administrations identified earlier, several In 2000, the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) released a compressive report on PPBS. BENS described itself as a nationwide, non-partisan public interest group, and a conduit through which senior business executives help enhance the nation's security. To focus on this stated mission, BENS claimed they are motivated by only one special interest: to help make America safe and secure. 47 This claim increased the importance and perhaps the credibility of their report. Released near the beginning of a new administration, the report presented recommendations that had a higher likelihood of being reviewed, as it is the common practice for a new administration to review existing practices and emplace its own methods of leadership and management. Available business perspective analysis, such as the BENs report, could only help the administration's review and actions.
The BENS report examined the PPBS process to determine if PPBS was meeting the needs of senior Defense Department officials in establishing a longer term defense program reflected in an annual budget. The study examined what the process is intended to do, what it actually does, and whether it should be retained, modified, or replaced in favor of some newer management construct. 48 The BENS report offered several important critiques of PPBS and notable recommendations to improve the system. The report also acknowledged what was termed a "rather surprising observation resulting from the interviews" conducted as part of the study as illustrated by the following comment:
Despite the common view that PPBS reflects an out-dated management approach, senior officials throughout the federal government in agencies other than DoD, and from executive branch offices having multidepartmental responsibility, almost universally perceived PPBS to be superior to any other resource allocation process in the executive branch. 49 While this comment would lead one to consider whether such relatively supportive views of PPBS indicate that little exists upon which to improve, BENS authors concluded that the strategic and technological environment had changed since the inception of the PPBS. This change required a strategic planning process that facilitates rather than hinders change, and they addressed concerns that the current Pentagon processes are part of the problem. 50 The most notable critique that BENS reported in 2000, which spoke volumes about a broken process, was that the Pentagon's PPBS was close to being a ritual event instead of a proactive process. The implication was that PPBS referred more to what had been, instead of what needed to be accomplished, and it was essentially a system of justification instead of anticipation. 51 This BENS group identified six major improvements to provide significant process and output enhancements to meet emerging defense needs. 52 These improvements were broadly identified as being structural, procedural, or technical in nature. 53 The first category focused on whether modifying key elements used in the practice of PPBS would be beneficial. An example would be modification of the data structure in the FYDP. The second category included items that are "structurally sound, but procedurally under-utilized or ineffectively synchronized," and an example cited was to transition to two-year budgeting cycles instead of an annual budget cycle. 54 The last category described efforts focused on accounting and the development of measures of performance and effectiveness useful for an organization as large as the DoD. 55 An example of this category would be developing measures for significant but competing activities, such as readiness and investment.
56
The procedural improvements recommended are most notable because of their similarities to aspects of the current PPBE process. As an example, the first procedural recommendation was to better manage and sequence the process. This is partially reflected in the current practice of issuing integrated program and budget review guidance, which is coordinated between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) and the Director, Programs Analysis and Evaluation (D,PA&E). 57 The integrated guidance attempts to provide tighter management so that guidance can be sequentially and smoothly translated into programmatic and budget detail. 58 The second recommendation was to adopt a two-year cycle, which is the Collectively, the composition of the company's leadership and the relationship with the U.S. Congress lended credibility to this report's analysis and recommendations. Two phases of the study critiqued the PPBE system and offered three broad recommendations.
A main area of this study's critique focused on the resource allocation process, which was viewed as stifling innovation. This process had disconnects between strategic planning, program and budgeting decisions, and also there was inadequate focus on program execution and policy implementation. 61 To address these areas, the first CSIS recommendation supported continued strengthening of the DoD's strategic direction and joint capabilities in the resourcing allocation process. In particular, they recommended building capabilities within Combatant Commands (COCOMS) to participate more actively in the resource allocation process. 62 CSIS additionally recommended enhancing the analytical abilities within the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) to provide additional independent analysis concerning joint programs when that provided by the Services and the Joint Staff was deficient or lacking. 63 CSIS's last recommendation was to create another OSD staff office responsible for independent, continuous policy implementation, and execution review.
Additionally, this office would gather all authoritative and directive guidance to establish a single, unified statement of the strategies as well as policies and programs to be followed, implemented, and executed. 64 In addition to the two key studies briefly described, DoD senior leaders had strong viewpoints about the quality of the system they inherited. The Current Process
Over ten years ago, the DoD began a FYDP improvement project that aimed to do the following: develop and operate systems to collect FYDP and supplementary data; automate report publication; improve its structure; improve efficiency and effectiveness of associated processes, systems, and data; and finally make data available for broad DoD analysis using analytical tools and integrated displays. 68 To meet these goals, PA&E created an authoritative database for accessing and analyzing DoD strategic resource information. In 1997, the database generated basic reports, contained a limited amount of query-ready data, and allowed components to upload limited data needed to support the PPBE process. The database is now the single authoritative database for accessing and analyzing DoD strategic resource information which includes program, budget, acquisition, manpower, and forces data and the FYDP. 69 The FYDP improvement project was a clear example of DoD striving for data transparency accessible to all the components, which was a key principal of the original system. This improvement project served as the basis for future reforms.
Upon Secretary Rumsfeld's arrival transforming the department was his highest priority, and this transformation also included processes. 70 In The PPBE process facilitated execution reviews of past decisions and actions. The reviews assessed the actual performance of programs individually and collectively relative to goals and targets. Recommendations from these reviews were then linked to decisions on future resource allocations and products of the acquisition and requirements processes were accepted as inputs to the PPBE system. The process flow that supported arriving at the desired end state in Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3 . This new process has four major elements: strategy, enhanced planning, resourcing, and execution and accountability. 77 These elements differ from the processes they replaced in four key ways. capabilities-based joint planning process known as the enhanced planning process (EPP) addressing both operational and enterprise issues. As such, it is the single, unified, fiscally-informed document covering both warfighting and enterprise capabilities. 81 This planning process analyzes capability gap issues provided by the SecDef. Alternative solutions to resolve the issues along with their associated joint implications are developed and presented to the SecDef for decision. The SPC reviews the capability gap issues and solutions developed in the planning process to ensure congruency with strategy. 82 Following the SecDef's decisions, fiscally constrained Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) is developed and issued in the April/May timeframe to implement those decisions. 83 The JPG solidifies the decisions made within a given year and subjects the totality of the guidance to a fiscal adequacy test to ensure that the Services and Defense Agencies have sufficient resources to comply with the guidance. 84 believing that the approach holds great promise, they also believed it implements the six fundamental ideas of the original PPBS. 89 With this knowledge in mind and knowing that PPBE has been in place for an additional three POM cycles with a forth about soon to begin, DoD should put in motion means to review the success, failures or challenges to the current PPBE process and do so on a recurring basis. The review should include challenging how well the process supports the six original fundamental principles either in the preferred holistic manner or by focusing on one or more of the principles at a time. The PA&E office currently conducts after action reviews following each program and budget review, but supplementing this review in conjunction with an outside agency would probably be beneficial, as indicated by the BENS and CSIS reports.
The second recommendation addresses the need to provide accurate guidance to 
Conclusion
Although modified frequently, PPBS evolved into PPBE and exists today because PPBS was never meant to be a closed, rigid or perfected management system. As examined, PPBS/PPBE is more a philosophy of management to guide DoD leaders along a more rational and objective approach than would otherwise be undertaken. 93 Due to the enormity of the programs and resourcing dollars associated with meeting the nation's defense needs, there are necessarily many actions and requirements placed upon DoD components. Components thus often view PPBE as taxing, overly complex and unresponsive to some of their concerns.
A variety and multitude of thoughts exist on the current relevancy and purpose of PPBE, the benefits and problems it brings to the Defense Department for allocating resources, and ways in which to "fix" it. Though it can be described by some as a complex series of overlapping processes, since its inception the foundation principles for PPBS and PPBE have endured through nine administrations. It continues to provide the fundamental structure and process under which military strategy is developed and translated into an annual defense budget-"A marvel of management or bureaucratic excess." 94 Pressure to modify aspects of the process, some with merit, still must account for realities that are often out of DoD's control. Both in PPBS and in PPBE, planning and programming can be essentially continuous activities, with only internal DoD calendar constraints on when to allow changes to be proposed, considered and decided upon. 95 Though there are no established deadlines associated with most of the activities, there are indeed two that are in law and are not likely to change, the 
